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"You shall not [harass] or oppress an alien, for you were once
aliens yourselves." Exodus 22:20
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent anti-immigration legislation illustrates the tension between
the federal and state governments over the distribution of power to
regulate immigration in the United States.' In the era before the fed-
eral government took control of immigration, the states were primar-
ily responsible for its regulation. Because of a perceived abuse of
authority, however, the Supreme Court began denying the states the
power to regulate immigration Today the federal government ex-
clusively controls the admission of aliens into America, and the states
must accept the decisions of the federal government in admitting
these legitimate residents.4 This loss of control over the entry of
immigrants has led some states to vent their frustrations through leg-
islative action against aliens.5 Attempting to regulate immigration by
discrimination against aliens, states may be crossing important fed-
eralism boundaries and infringing on the fights of legal resident ali-
ens at the same time. State exclusion of aliens-both legal and ille-
gal-from government benefits raises numerous issues of policy, law,
and justice.
The method of analyzing laws that discriminate against aliens,
however, remains unclear. In some cases, courts have combined ele-
1. See Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services,
Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L.
REv. 1425, 1452 (1995) [hereinafter Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws].
2. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law
(1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1834 (1993).
3. See Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws, supra note 1, at 1436.
4. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376-80 (1971); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-67 (1941).
5. See Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws, supra note 1, at 1452.
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ments of a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection test with a con-
sideration of the plenary nature of Congress's power over immigra-
tion.6 In other cases, courts have applied a simple preemption analy-
sis to determine if the law discriminating against aliens is preempted
by an existing or possible federal statute or statutory scheme.7 The
courts have yet to articulate a controlling constitutional doctrine
upon which alienage cases must be decided. This ambiguity has led
to confusion over which standard of review applies and what the re-
spective capabilities of the state and federal governments are in dis-
criminating against immigrants. Determination of the appropriate
doctrinal basis is critically important because each produces a differ-
ent result.
Thus, courts use three approaches in analyzing alienage cases-
federal statutory authorization, federalism, and equal protection.
This Comment argues that of the three approaches, equal protection
should be the preferred method of analysis. If state discrimination
against aliens were authorized through specific federal legislation,
then the states would be allowed to discriminate against aliens under
the authority of the federal government! Likewise, federal authori-
zation of state discrimination against aliens raises little, if any, fed-
eralism concerns for the states. Either of these two doctrines re-
quires a court to review the discriminating state law to determine if it
conflicts with federal regulation of immigration.9 Using principles of
equal protection, however, Congress could not authorize the states to
discriminate against aliens because such an authorization would vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 Because alien residents lack ac-
cess to the political process, they are vulnerable to governmental ig-
norance of their concerns and are defenseless against mistreatment.
By using equal protection as the underlying doctrinal basis, the courts
would ensure that the states will not assume undeserved broad dis-
cretion in discriminating against immigrants.
This Comment discusses Congress's ability to authorize the
states to discriminate against aliens. Part II explains the trend of na-
tivism and its effects on legislation discriminating against immigrants.
This Part asks whether state laws influenced by this trend are consti-
6. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 370-83; Takahashi v. Fish & Game Conm'n, 334
U.S. 410,412-22 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,35-43 (1915).
7. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,354-63 (1976).
8. See discussion infra Part V.A.
9. See discussion infra Part V.B.
10. See discussion infra Part V.C.
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tutional and if not, under what doctrine they must be analyzed. Part
III discusses the derivation of federal power to discriminate against
aliens and to regulate immigration. Part IV then considers the states'
power to discriminate against immigrants. Finally, Part V analyzes
the ability of Congress to delegate power to the states to discrimi-
nate. It explores the three competing doctrinal bases underlying such
power: federal statutory authorization, federalism, and equal pro-
tection. This Comment posits that an equal protection analysis is the
preferred method by which to interpret alienage discrimination cases
and that Congress cannot authorize the states to act in ways which
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. NATIVISM: IMMIGRANTS AS SCAPEGOATS
Nativism is defined as "intense opposition to an internal minor-
ity on the ground of its foreign (i.e., 'un-American') connections."11
The undeniable history of nativism in America 2 demonstrates the
need for heightened protection of alienage classifications at the
state level. Under the doctrine of nativism, members of minorities
become the "enemies of a distinctively American way of life. ' 14 A
recurring theme in American history is the resurgence of nativism
during times of great national stress.15 For instance, the historical cy-
cle of nativism roughly correlates with the fluctuation of a market
economy. 6 During times of economic and political instability, the
states manifest their anxieties through hostile legislation against im-
migrants.7
Historically, nativist sentiment has been directed at the leading
immigrant group of the day, such as the Irish in the early and mid-
1800s, the Chinese in the late 1800s, and the Mexicans throughout
11. JOHN IGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM 1860-1925 4 (2d ed. 1988).
12. See Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust An Essay on American
Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269, 277-
78 (1992).
13. Groups considered to be "discrete and insular minorities" receive height-
ened judicial review. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53
n.4 (1938).
14. HIGHAM, supra note 11, at 4.
15. See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection
of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1511
(1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration].
16. See id.
17. See Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws, supra note 1, at 1437.
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much of the twentieth century.18 The Irish were targeted because of
their perceived political and economic threat to society. 9 The desire
to protect white labor against the competition of the Chinese"s moti-
vated the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Acts."' In addition, espe-
cially in the West, nativist sentiment was aimed at Mexican immi-
grants because of their perceived threat to the economy and the labor
force.n During the 1930s, in response to the Depression, Mexican
immigrants were subjected to "Operation Wetback," a system by
which the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) immediately
deported any alleged immigrant suspected of being illegal.' These
historic situations illustrate the government's response to the theme
of nativism in American history-defining "American identity
through the law the using components of ethnicity."24
Consistent with historical precedent, there have been many re-
cent governmental actions against both legal and illegal aliens, fueled
by feelings of nativism.2 California's Proposition 187 (Prop. 187)26 is
one example of proposed state discrimination against aliens. The
legislation denies basic benefits to immigrants and "imposes a sys-
18. See Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular De-
mocracy, and California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Ir-
relevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REv. 629, 635 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, An
Essay on Immigration Politics].
19. See HIGHAM, supra note 11, at 26.
20. See Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws, supra note 1, at 1436.
21. Act of May 6, 1882, Ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882); see GEORGE BROWN
TINDALL & DAVID E. SmI, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 861, 894-95 (4th
ed. 1996). In 1882 Congress voted to prohibit Chinese immigration for 10 years.
The legislation received overwhelming support. Because the number of Asian
laborers was increasing the tension between workers and management in the
American economy, legislators reasoned that the gate to Chinese immigration
must be closed. See id. at 895.
22. See Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, supra note 18, at 633; see
generally TINDALL & Sin, supra note 21, at 1561-65 (discussing new nativism).
23. See Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The So-
cial and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv.
263, 274 (1996-1997); see also MY FAMILY (American Zoetrope 1995) (movie
which graphically portrays the indiscretion of the INS in forcefully deporting
those suspected of being illegal).
24. Perea, supra note 12, at 277.
25. Motivated by feelings of economic and political instability, politicians and
leaders have capitalized on anti-immigrant sentiment and have made aliens the
scapegoats. See Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration, supra note 15, at
1511-13. Economic and cultural anxiety today results from economic change and
represents residual affects from the recession in the early 1990s. See id. There
has been strong sentiment among the middle class over the last fifteen years that
its economic status is tenuous. See id.
26. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West).
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tematic program for driving illegal aliens out of California.2' It en-
courages aliens to deport themselves by depriving them of the eco-
nomic and social resources necessary for survival: protection against
crime and fire; rescue from floods and earthquakes; emergency medi-
cal treatment; health care; and inoculation against epidemics.? In
addition, Prop. 187 makes children of illegal aliens ineligible for child
protective services and women ineligible for social services, such as
prenatal care and domestic violence centers' counseling and protec-
tion.29 Using its federal preemption powers, a federal court recently
declared Prop. 187 unconstitutional? Accordingly, California is cur-
rently prohibited from acting on Prop. 187 because federal law super-
sedes the state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause." Proponents
of the legislation, however, are still actively working to put it into ef-
fect through other legal means.'
Another example of recent governmental efforts to discriminate
against aliens is the Welfare Reform Act (Welfare Act)33 passed by
Congress and signed by President Clinton on August 22, 1996.4 The
Welfare Act encourages states to discriminate against aliens by de-
claring that state and local governments may only continue aid to
immigrants if states pass new laws specifically authorizing such assis-
tance.35 The federal legislation permits states to deny benefits such as
27. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws, supra note 1, at 1445.
28. See id. at 1446.
29. See id. at 1446-47.
30. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, No. CV 94-7569
MRP, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18776, at *48 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 1997); see also
Patrick J. McDonnell, Judges Final Order Kills Key Points of Prop. 187, L.A.
Tuvms, Mar. 19, 1998, at A3 (discussing the unenforceability of Prop. 187 based
on preemption principles). "California is powerless to enact its own legislative
scheme to regulate immigration." Id.
31. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.
32. A federal judge ruled that California can use the nation's new welfare law
to implement cuts in aid to illegal immigrants that were previously banned. See
Patrick J. McDonnell & Virginia Ellis, Welfare Law Will Allow Wilson to Cut
Immigrant Aid, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1996, at Al.
33. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
34. See id.
35. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Legal Advocacy Groups Sue over Food Stamp
1037
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1033
food stamps to both legal and illegal aliens.36 Therefore, the federal
legislation allows states to argue that Congress is directing them to
deny benefits to immigrants.
The Immigration in the National Interest Act (Act)37 is yet an-
other recent example of congressional efforts authorizing states to
discriminate against aliens. The Act proposes increased efforts to
strengthen border patrols and deportation. 8 As part of the legisla-
tion, Representative Elton Gallegly39 proposed an amendment that
authorizes states to deny public education benefits to aliens unlaw-
fully present in the United States.4 The amendment was later
dropped from the Act but is presently being proposed as a separate
bill 
41
Are these recent examples of governmental efforts to discrimi-
nate against aliens constitutional? Who has the power to regulate
immigration in this manner? If these laws are unconstitutional, un-
der what doctrinal basis must they be analyzed? The next two Parts
discuss which layer of government has the power to enact such laws.
III. FEDERAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ALIENS
The Constitution grants to the federal government the authority
to create "uniform Rules of Naturalization, ' '42 and thereby the power
to regulate immigration.4 Immigration is exclusively the subject of
federal power, and Congress has complete control over the admission
of aliens to this country.4 Therefore, "[t]he corollary of this plenary
and exclusive federal power is that states are powerless to regulate
immigration."45
Changes, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1996, at A3.
36. See id.
37. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1996); see Marc Lacey, Conferees OK Bill to Crack
Down on Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, at Al.
38. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1996).
39. H- CA (R- Sini Valley).
40. See 142 CONG. REC. H2475 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Gallegly).
41. See Lacey, supra note 37, at Al.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 4.
43. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875). Federal power to
regulate immigration is also derived from the Commerce Clause and foreign af-
fairs powers.
44. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) ("Power to regulate immi-
gration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.").
45. Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22
HASTINGS CONsT. L. Q. 939, 944-45 (1995); see also Unenforced Boundaries: Il-
legal Immigration and the Limits of Judicial Federalism, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1643,
1644-45 (1995) (noting that states have no power to control the influx of illegal
1038
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Because Congress can exercise complete control over immigra-
tion regulation, separation of powers concerns dictate the use of the
lowest standard of judicial review for federal immigration laws.' The
courts recognize their inability to differentiate between federal im-
migration policy and federal policy towards specific groups of immi-
grants, and apply a rational basis standard of judicial review to all ac-
tions the federal government takes regarding aliens.' The federal
government is given more discretion than the states to discriminate
against immigrants because of its role in protecting the nation's bor-
ders, regulating commerce, and controlling foreign affairs.4 Thus,
the courts have a limited function in reviewing any federal congres-
sional action discriminating against immigrants. 9
A. Plenary Powers Doctrine
Based upon Congress's complete power over immigration and
the reduced judicial standard of review-rational basis-given to
federal statutes, special judicial deference is given to Congress re-
garding immigration law.' The Court has described this special judi-
cial deference doctrine as Congress's "plenary power" to regulate
immigration." The degree of deference the Supreme Court has given
to Congress has varied. In the beginning, the concept of plenary
power was viewed to be absolute, giving the courts virtually no power
immigrants) [hereinafter Unenforced Boundaries]. Despite its exclusive control
over immigration, the federal government has generally been unwilling to assist
states in defraying the costs of immigration. See Unenforced Boundaries, supra,
at 1645. A flaw in state/federal relations regarding immigration is the ambiguous
line of political and economic accountability. See id. at 1648. Lax enforcement
of federal immigration prohibitions has created a huge economic burden on
states. See id. Economic pressures have obligated states to allocate limited state
resources to deal with the problem. See id. Therefore, voters, unaware of the
state/federal dynamic at the heart of such economic difficulty, may perceive state
and local representatives as unresponsive to popular will. See id. Dissatisfaction
directed at state and local officials is more properly directed to the federal gov-
ernment. See id.
46. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976).
47. See id.; see also Corinna Barrett Lain, Outraged over Immigration: Re-
thinking Doctrinal Responses, 82 VA. L. REv. 987, 1005-19 (1996) ("[T]he Su-
preme Court cannot always distinguish between federal alien classifications de-
signed to further immigration policy and those that are not, so it prefers to avoid
the inquiry altogether.").
48. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81 n.17.
49. See id.
50. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigra-
tion, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 925-26 (1995); in-
fra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
51. See Legomsky, supra note 50, at 925-26.
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to review the constitutional validity of the federal government's ac-
tions.' However, in time, the Court has broadened its view and has
established a larger, albeit limited, judicial role in assessing the con-
stitutionality of federal immigration laws. 3
The Supreme Court has employed several justifications of its
special judicial restraint in immigration cases.' For example, the
Court has suggested that the constitutionality of immigration is in-
herently a political question because immigration is conjoined with
foreign affairs. 5 Another theory offered by the Court is that because
an alien is merely a "guest" asserting a "privilege," rather than a
"member" asserting a "right," allowing aliens to assert constitutional
rights would give them an unfair advantage over United States citi-
zens.56 A further justification is that aliens' lack of allegiance to our
nation rightfully corresponds with lessened constitutional protec-
tion.' In addition, the Court has reasoned that the federal power to
regulate immigration is inherent in national sovereignty and is there-
fore protected from normal constitutional restrictions.58 A final the-
ory offered by the Court to justify the plenary power given to Con-
gress is stare decisis.59  The Court has also recognized that the
principle of plenary power given to the federal government to control
immigration has become too indelible in precedent to be overruled.,
Regardless of the theories behind the special deference given to
Congress in immigration law, the plenary powers doctrine is firmly
established and is a necessary consideration for courts evaluating
52. See id.; see also Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476, 480 (1893) (stating
that power to exclude aliens is "absolute" and is "not open to challenge in the
courts").
53. See Legomsky, supra note 50, at 926; see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (stating that immigration legislation is "largely im-
mune from judicial inquiry or interference").
54. See Legomsky, supra note 50, at 927-28.
55. See id. at 927; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993) (describing
alien regulation as "committed to the political branches of the Federal Govern-
ment"). The political question doctrine refers to the Supreme Court's restraint
in deciding matters which it concludes are committed by the Constitution to
other branches of government for decision. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-
11 (1962).
56. See Legomsky, supra note 50, at 927-28.
57. See id. at 928.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.; see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531-32 (1954) (stating that
"[w]e are not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or more sensitive to human
rights than our predecessors... and must therefore under our constitutional sys-




B. Federal Discrimination Cases
Mathews v. Diaz2 illustrates the need for flexibility in national
policy choices and demonstrates why decisions regarding immigra-
tion are more appropriately left to either the legislative or the execu-
tive branches, rather than to the judiciary.' In Mathews the Court
held that Congress may condition an alien's eligibility for participa-
tion in a federal medical insurance program on continuous residence
in the United States for five years and on admission for permanent
residence.' The Court's holding hinged upon the conclusions
reached in Graham v. Richardson,65 where the Court held that the
state's denial of welfare benefits to resident aliens not satisfying resi-
dency requirements encroached upon the exclusive federal power
over the regulation of immigrants.' The Mathews Court used this
reasoning in determining that "it is the business of the political
branches of the [f]ederal [g]overnment, rather than that of either the
[s]tates or the [f]ederal [fjudiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry
and residence of aliens." 67
Mathews emphasized that although there are millions of aliens
within the jurisdiction of the United States, each one of these persons
is guaranteed the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protections
against deprivation of life, liberty, and property without due process
of law."' Even a person "whose presence in this country is unlawful,
involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protec-
tion."69 However, the acknowledgment that all persons, including ali-
ens, are protected by the Constitution, does not imply that all aliens
61. But see Legomsky, supra note 50, at 936-37. Some scholars predict a
weakening of the special judicial deference to Congress in immigration. See id. at
936. Legomsky envisions the emergence of a weaker version of the plenary pow-
ers doctrine. He believes that specific exceptions will be created, other constitu-
tional challenges will emerge, and that the Court will begin to make less frequent
references to the plenary nature of Congress's power. See id. at 937.
62. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
63. See id. at 81.
64. See id. at 69.
65. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
66. See id. at 378; discussion infra Part IV.A.
67. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84.
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CoNST. amend. xiv, § 1; Mathews, 403
U.S. at 77.
69. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77.
April 1998] 1041
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:1033
are entitled to all the advantages of citizenship.'
The federal government has the discretion to create distinctions
between citizens and aliens as part of the exercise of its broad power
over immigration regulation.71 "The fact that an Act of Congress
treats aliens differently from citizens does not in itself imply that such
disparate treatment is 'invidious."' 2 As long as Congress satisfies the
rational basis standard of review-assuring that the distinctions are
not wholly irrational-then Congress can impose whatever restric-
tions it desires on alienage.73
Even if legislation satisfies rational basis review, the inevitable
result of drawing classifications is that arbitrary and harsh conse-
quences will occur.74 The plenary powers doctrine, however, gives
Congress substantial leeway in creating policy to protect the borders
and regulate foreign affairs. The consequence of a lower standard of
review regarding alienage classifications for the federal government
is that rational lines will be drawn between citizens and aliens, with
great deference given to Congress.
IV. STATE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ALIENS
Because Congress's power over immigration is so broad and ple-
nary, any state law attempting to regulate in this area must not be
preempted. Where a state law discriminating against aliens is not
preempted, that law must also pass scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment. This Part discusses the scope of states' power to regu-
late immigration and, as a corollary, discriminate against aliens.
A. Federal Preemption of State Laws
Based upon the Supremacy Clause, the federal government can
establish laws that the states are required to follow.75 Federal law su-
persedes any conflicting state laws. State and federal laws often
70. See id. at 78.
71. See id. at 79-80.
72. Id. at 80.
73. See id. at 82-83.
74. See id. at 83.
75. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
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conflict for one of two reasons. First, it may be impossible to obey
the state and federal regulations simultaneously if the language of the
statutes is in direct opposition. 6 Second, even if the federal and state
regulations do not conflict on their face, the objectives behind the
two regulations may be inconsistent.' State regulations can therefore
be invalidated upon this basis as well.78 The problems of conflict be-
tween federal and state regulations most often arise where there is a
need to balance national and local concerns."
States may not regulate immigration or conditions of residency
for aliens when federal laws preempt them.? Federal authority to
regulate the status of aliens derives from various constitutional and
inherently sovereign sources, including the power "[t]o establish [a]
uniform Rule of Naturalization,"81 the power to regulate commerce, 8
and broad authority over foreign affairs.' The federal government
possesses the preeminent role of regulating aliens within our bor-
ders.'
In Graham v. Richardson the Court prevented a state from con-
ditioning welfare benefits on alien residency requirements under the
auspices of federal preemption and equal protection principles.' The
Court reasoned that the federal government has broad constitutional
power to admit aliens and regulate the terms and conditions of their
76. See, e.g., McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913) (invalidating Wis-
consin law which conflicted with the Federal Food and Drug Act).
77. See Manheim, supra note 45, at 944-45 n.35.
78. See Hilisborough County v. Automated Med. Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 707,713
(1985). State and federal law conflict when "'compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility' . . or when state law 'stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress .... ."' Id. For a general review of the preemption doctrine, see Cali-
fornia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,281-83 (1987).
79. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (balancing the state's
need to secure information in regard to aliens within its own boundaries and the
federal government's responsibilities in the field of international affairs).
80. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 379 (1971).
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
82. Id. cl. 3.
83. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976); Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
84. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588-89; Hines, 312 U.S. at 62 (holding that fed-
eral power in the field of foreign affairs, including power over immigration, is su-
preme); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275,280 (1875).
85. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 376, 382-83. The Arizona and Pennsylvania laws
at issue imposed minimum residency requirements on the welfare eligibility of
aliens, but not of citizens. See id. at 367-68.
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stay and naturalization." "State laws that restrict the eligibility of
aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their alienage conflict
with these overriding national policies in an area constitutionally en-
trusted to the [f]ederal [g]overnment."' Where the federal govern-
ment has established a scheme of regulation, states cannot act incon-
sistently with congressional intent or interfere with federal law."
Furthermore, "[s]tate laws which impose discriminatory burdens
upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United
States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal power to
regulate immigration, and have accordingly been held invalid."89
In addition to invalidating the state law on federal preemption
grounds, the Graham Court also considered equal protection princi-
ples. ° Although the federal government has broad constitutional
power to regulate immigration, "Congress does not have the power
to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protection
Clause."9' In analyzing alienage cases on both principles of preemp-
tion and equal protection, the doctrinal basis behind these cases re-
mains unclear.'
Although the Court's analysis in Graham was unclear, an equal
protection approach is the better method of analysis. If alienage
cases are instead based on principles of preemption or federalism,
86. See id. at 382; see also Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 587 (upholding the deporta-
tion of a legally resident alien because of his membership in the Communist
Party due to Congress's wide discretion in this area); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (invalidating a state statute barring issuance of
commercial fishing licenses to noncitizens due to the federal government's ex-
clusive regulation of immigration); Hines, 312 U.S. at 66 (emphasizing that the
regulation of aliens is "intimately blended and intertwined" with responsibilities
of the federal government); Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893)
(stating that the power to exclude aliens is "vested in the political departments of
the government, and is to be regulated by... acts of Congress"); The Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (stating that the power of exclusion of
foreigners is an incident of sovereignty belonging to the federal government).
87. Graham, 403 U.S. at 378.
88. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67 (striking down a Pennsylvania alien registra-
tion statute on grounds of federal preemption).
89. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419.
90. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 370-76.
91. Id. at 382 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969)).
92. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (invalidating a university's
policy of granting preferential treatment for purposes of tuition and fees to stu-
dents with in-state status). The Court recognized that both the federal govern-
ment's broad authority over immigration and the substantial limitations upon the
states in making classifications based on alienage constrains the states from dis-
criminating against aliens. See id. at 10-17. The Court invalidated the law based
on a mixed Fourteenth Amendment/Supremacy Clause rationale. See id.
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states could constitutionally discriminate against aliens. That is, be-
cause of the federal government's plenary power over immigration,
Congress could validly delegate some of its authority to the states to
act on its behalf or in congruence with federal legislation. The rights
of immigrants, however, would be better protected against exploita-
tion and abuse by the states through the use of an equal protection
analysis. Based on an equal protection approach, Congress cannot
authorize the states to discriminate against aliens because this would
entail a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Equal Protection Analysis of State Laws
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provides
that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."" However, this is not a guarantee that
every law will treat every person equally.' Most legislation involves
classifications placing special burdens on, or granting specific benefits
to, individuals or groups."' According to the doctrine of reasonable
classification, laws may indeed discriminate.96 In essence, the Four-
teenth Amendment merely requires that those who are similarly situ-
ated be similarly treated.'
Because aliens cannot participate in the political process and
lack societal decision-making power, discrimination against them is
more carefully evaluated. Aliens might be singled out for disparate
treatment because they have no direct political recourse. If this is the
perceived purpose for discriminatory treatment, courts will more
closely scrutinize the law.99
The Supreme Court has applied different levels of scrutiny to
certain categories of alienage classifications.'00 This has led to the de-
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
94. See WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 679 (9th ed. 1993).
95. See id.
96. See generally Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection
of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 344-53 (1949) (discussing the concept of rea-
sonable classification).
97. See id.
98. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRuST 161-62 (1980).
99. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
The infamous footnote four establishes a framework for heightened judicial re-
view. Groups considered to be "discrete and insular minorities" receive height-
ened review-state legislation involving race and alienage receive strict scrutiny,
whereas gender and illegitimacy receive intermediate scrutiny. See id.
100. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (state discrimination against
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velopment of a complex equal protection doctrine."' Alienage dis-
crimination by the federal government is subject to a rational basis
standard of review.'02 The rational basis test generally presumes that
legislation is constitutional,03 and a court will uphold a law if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest."° Under this standard of review, the court defers to
legislative judgment whenever possible, requiring some plausible set
of facts to justify the statute.1°5
State discrimination against aliens, however, is subject to strict
scrutiny, with some exceptions.'O In order to survive strict scrutiny,
the suspect classification must be closely tailored to a compelling
state interest.1°7 Two suspect classes trigger strict scrutiny: race or
national origin and alienage.'O' Laws implicating a suspect class are
almost always found to be unconstitutional because strict scrutiny is
difficult to satisfy.' State action regarding alienage is subject to a
higher standard of review than federal action in most cases."0
1. Discrimination by states against legal aliens
Under traditional equal protection principles, a state may dis-
criminate against individuals or groups so long as its classification has
a reasonable basis."' In Graham v. Richardson, however, the Court
established that "classifications based on alienage, like those based
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close ju-
aliens is usually subject to strict scrutiny except when it involves a political func-
tion); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (legislation received heightened scrutiny
when children of illegal aliens were deprived of public school education);
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (alienage discrimination by Congress re-
mains subject to the rational basis test).
101. See Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws, supra note 1, at 1426.
102. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 82-84.
103. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
601 (5th ed. 1995).
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See Bernal, 467 U.S. at 220 (holding that alienage is subject to strict scru-
tiny unless the political function exception applies).
107. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 103, at 601-02.
108. See id. at 602.
109. See id.
110. The inconsistent standard of review applied to state and federal action
has been criticized by scholars who question "whether alienage discrimination
really requires the stricter scrutiny that race receives." Neuman, Aliens as Out-
laws, supra note 1, at 1438.
111. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970).
112. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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dicial scrutiny."' The Court reasoned that "[a]liens as a class are a
prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."14 The statutes at issue
in Graham failed the strict scrutiny test because the Court concluded
that the states' desire to preserve welfare benefits for their own citi-
zes was not a compelling interest."5
Although some challenge heightened equal protection scrutiny
for discrimination against aliens by states, the need for protection
against state alienage discrimination is crucial."6 "The government's
decision to permit aliens to reside within the community and to sub-
ject them to its governance without giving them political rights cre-
ates responsibilities on the part of the government."" Many alien
residents are exposed to governmental neglect or even hostility with-
out access to the political process."8 Since the 1920s, no state has
permitted aliens to vote in statewide or federal elections, and politi-
cal processes do not represent those who do not vote."9 In addition,
the realities of nativism affect discriminatory legislation and exacer-
bate feelings of powerlessness among aliens without a political
voice." Thus, Justice Blackmun correctly characterized aliens as a
suspect class in Graham."'
State laws classifying on the basis of alienage are subject to strict
scrutiny except when the state acts to bar aliens from performing
"political functions."' The exception applies to laws that "exclude
aliens from positions intimately related to the process of democratic
113. Id. at 371-72. Aliens who were denied welfare benefits challenged two
laws: an Arizona law that provided welfare to citizens but not to aliens unless
they had resided in: the United States for fifteen years, and a Pennsylvania law
that excluded aliens from certain state funded welfare benefits. The Court held
that the laws violated the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 376.
114. Id. at 372 (citation omitted).
115. See id. at 374-75.
116. See Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws, supra note 1, at 1439; see, e.g., Toll v.
Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 41 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (doubting whether po-
litical powerlessness is a legitimate reason for treating immigrants as a suspect
class subject to heightened judicial review); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,
651-57 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (invalidating a law making citizenship a
requirement for any position in the class of a state civil service system).
117. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws, supra note 1, at 1427.
118. See id. at 1428.
119. See id.
120. See HIGHAM, supra note 11, at 4; discussion supra Part II.
121. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 371-72.
122. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 225 (1984) (holding the political func-
tion exception inapplicable to notary publics).
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self-government."' The political function exception lowers the stan-
dard of review from strict scrutiny to rational basis in applicable
cases.
12A
In Bernal v. Fainter2' the Court applied a two-part test in de-
termining whether an activity qualified as a political function."6 The
Court concluded that a notary public did not qualify under the politi-
cal function exception. m First, the Court examined the function of
the position.m In looking "to the actual function of the position as
the dispositive factor,"'m and not the source of the position, the Court
determined that the function of a notary public is "essentially clerical
and ministerial."'m Second, it looked to the extent of the policy-
making responsibility:
The focus of [the Court's] inquiry [was] whether a position
was such that the officeholder would necessarily exercise
broad discretionary power over the formulation or execu-
tion of public policies importantly affecting the citizen
population-power of the sort that a self-governing com-
munity could properly entrust only to full-fledged members
of that community."'
The rationale behind the political function exception is that
states may establish their own form of government within broad
boundaries and limit the right to govern to those who are full-fledged
members of the political community.tm In establishing the political
function exception, the Court emphasized that it must be narrowly
construed."3 Otherwise, "the exception will swallow the rule and de-
123. Id. at 220.
124. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) (concluding that
strict scrutiny was inappropriate when the restriction on lawfully resident aliens
primarily serves a political function).
125. 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
126. See id. at 221-22.
127. See id. at 225-27.
128. See id. at 223.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 225.
131. Id. at 223-24.
132. See id. at 224; see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (extending
the political function exception to include public school teachers); Foley v. Con-
nelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (upholding a New York statute that required police
force members to be citizens and barred aliens from positions as police officers
because of the fundamental obligation of the government which has broad dis-
cretionary powers); Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 651-57 (striking down a state civil
service statute that reserved certain permanent positions for citizens).
133. See Bernal, 467 U.S. at 222 n.7.
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preciate the significance that should attach to the designation of a
group as a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom heightened judi-
cial solicitude is appropriate."'' Thus, states have the power to dis-
criminate against legal aliens if a strict scrutiny standard of review is
satisfied, or if the political function exception applies and rational
basis is met.
2. Discrimination by states against undocumented aliens
Undocumented alien adults do not enjoy the same constitutional
protections as legal aliens." Unauthorized entry into the United
States is a crime," and those who have entered illegally are subject to
deportation.' Despite the existence of these legal barriers, however,
a substantial number of people have entered the United States un-
lawfully.38 Underenforcement of the laws prohibiting entry into this
country, coupled with the failure to prevent the employment of un-
documented aliens, has resulted in a massive influx of illegal immi-
grants. 3 '9 While an increasing number of undocumented resident ali-
ens are encouraged to remain here as a source of cheap labor, they
are denied the benefits provided to legal residents." They are left
defenseless against abuse and exploitation, but their presence is tol-
erated and their employment is welcomed. 4 "The existence of such
an underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that
prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under law."' 42
While legal aliens are given protection as a suspect class, the Su-
preme Court has explicitly stated that undocumented alien adults are
not a suspect class. 43 According to the Court, their presence in the
United States is the product of their own voluntary unlawful con-
duct.' 44 Their entry into the United States is a crime.4 In addition,
the Court created suspect classes to protect discrete and insular mi-
134. Id.; see Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws, supra note 1, at 1438 (commenting
that some scholars believe the public function exception has become too expan-
sive and contributes to an inconsistent equal protection doctrine).
135. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,219 n.19 (1982).
136. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(1996).
137. See id. §§ 1251, 1252.
138. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205.
139. See id. at 218.
140. See id. at 219.
141. See id. at 219 n.18.
142. Id. at 219.
143. See id. at 219 n.19.
144. See id. at 219.
145. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325.
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norities discriminated against based on "immutable characteris-
tics."" 6 Undocumented status is not "an absolutely immutable char-
acteristic since it is the product of conscious, indeed unlawful, ac-
tion."' 47 Thus, classifications that discriminate against undocumented
aliens are subject to rational basis review, with substantial deference
given to the legislature."4
Although undocumented alien adults are not a suspect class, the
children of undocumented aliens are viewed differently. 149  While
those electing voluntarily to enter the United States in violation of
the laws should be prepared to bear the consequences, "the children
of those illegal entrants are not comparably situated."'" The adults
have the ability to abide by the law, but the children "can affect nei-
ther their parents' conduct nor their own status."''
In 1982 the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe extended intermedi-
ate scrutiny protection beyond traditional classes to include undocu-
mented alien children. In that case the Court invalidated a law that
denied undocumented alien children the right to attend public
schools.53 The Court reasoned that controlling the conduct of adults
by acting against their children "does not comport with fundamental
conceptions of justice."' However, these children were not desig-
nated as a quasi-suspect class deserving intermediate scrutiny.
Rather, the Court applied a new standard of review that has come to
be known as "rational basis plus."'55 The Court effectively created
146. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
147. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
148. See id. at 216.
149. See id. at 219-20.
150. Id. at 220.
151. Id. (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,770 (1977)).
152. See id. at 230. Increasing dissatisfaction with a two-tiered approach to
equal protection-strict scrutiny and rational basis-prompted the Supreme
Court to add a third standard of review. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring). The Court developed intermediate scrutiny to
protect other groups that lack access to the political process and confined it to
gender and illegitimacy classifications. See id. Under this standard of review,
classifications must be substantially related to the achievement of important gov-
ernmental objectives. See id. at 210-11.
153. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
154. Id. at 220.
155. The standard has also been called "rational basis with bite." See Gayle
Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 784-85 (1986-1987). The Court broke from the
traditional equal protection analysis. See id. at 784. This can be seen as an effort
by the Court to put more teeth into the rational basis test without approaching
intermediate scrutiny. See id. Rational basis plus is one step beyond rational
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this new standard of review without explicitly articulating its exis-
tence.
5 6
The Court offered three justifications for its decision in Plyler.
First, the Court reasoned that the children deserved some protection
approaching a quasi-suspect class because they were practically pow-
erless against their parents and society." Second, although the right
to education is not fundamental," 8 it deserved some protection as a
quasi-fundamental right."9 The Court found that education is not a
fundamental right but "[it] has a fundamental role in maintaining the
fabric of our society. ' 'l 6 The Court's finding of "the importance of
education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact
of its deprivation on the life of the child" supports its status as a
quasi-fundamental right.16' Third, the children had been completely
denied access to education. The Court reasoned that "education
provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically
productive lives to the benefit [of society]."'63 Invoking rational basis
plus allowed the Court to consider these factors and prevent
"unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual
merit."' ' Due to the importance of education in forming a person's
ability to function in society and the fact that denial of all education
benefits would result in the total deprivation of any opportunity to
advance on the basis of individual merit, the Court concluded that it
should not allow the state to deny education to these children."
Thus, Plyler established that state action denying undocumented
basis because it looks more closely at the fit between the legitimate governmental
interest and the means of achieving that interest, without giving complete defer-
ence to the legislature. See id. at 784-85. It can be used to review legislation bur-
dening a right on a group approaching quasi-suspect status. See id. at 785.
156. See id. at 786-87.
157. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20; Pettinga, supra note 155, at 785.
158. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). If
a classification burdens a fundamental right, the classification will be subject to
strict scrutiny. Two general classes of rights are considered fundamental, mean-
ing that any interference with them will give rise to strict equal protection scru-
tiny. The first consists of rights which are independent and explicitly guaranteed
by a constitutional provision. The second are rights which are felt to be both im-
portant and implicitly granted by the Constitution, so that large deviations in
equality as to them are viewed as suspect. See id.
159. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-23; Pettinga, supra note 155, at 785.
160. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 226.
163. Id. at 221.
164. Id. at 222.
165. See id. at 221-23.
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alien children a quasi-fundamental right should receive a higher level
of judicial scrutiny than should federal action.' The rational basis
plus standard in this context only applies to state laws."7 Federal laws
discriminating against all undocumented aliens still receive highly
deferential review.' This distinction allows the federal government
to pass laws satisfying a lower standard of review and to essentially
un-preempt state laws that normally would have to meet a higher
level of judicial review.169 Because federal law is supreme, the federal
government can create laws exacting a lower constitutional standard
of review.' The states therefore can act in concert with federal
authority if federal preemption is the underlying doctrinal basis."
If Plyler were based on an equal protection approach, however,
state legislation denying illegal immigrant children access to educa-
tion would be invalid because Congress would be violating the Con-
stitution. In Plyler, the Supreme Court for the first time expanded
the scope of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to give undocumented resident aliens limited protection from
state laws which arbitrarily denied them benefits:' "Justice Brennan
found no reason not to apply the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause liter-
ally; the majority ruled that laws which gave unequal treatment to
unlawfully resident aliens were subject to some form of judicial re-
view under the terms of the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause. ' "'
Though the decision in Plyler has been criticized as an unprece-
dented deviation from standard equal protection principles,'74 the
Court's application of heightened judicial review can be justified as
emphasizing the value of the equal protection doctrine.' In Plyler
Justice Marshall advocated "rejecting a rigidified approach to equal
protection analysis, and... employing an approach that allows for
varying levels of scrutiny depending upon 'the constitutional and so-
cietal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recog-
166. See Manheim, supra note 45, at 1011.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 944-45.
170. See id. at 945-46.
171. If equal protection is the underlying doctrinal basis for challenge, Con-
gress cannot authorize the states to violate the Constitution. See Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
641 (1969)).
172. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
173. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 103, at 755.
174. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 47, at 1005-19.
175. See Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws, supra note 1, at 1444.
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nized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classifica-
tion is drawn."' 6
Thus, as Justice Marshall seemed to recognize, the equal protec-
tion doctrine should be viewed as subject to a sliding scale of scrutiny
rather than to a static three-tiered approach. This perspective allows
for flexibility in protecting important societal interests from invidious
discrimination that do not fit neatly into pre-determined categories.
Therefore, the Court's decision in Plyler can be justified in its treat-
ment of education as extremely important, though not fundamental,
and undocumented children as special, though not suspect. This ap-
proach acknowledges the equal protection doctrine's value in protect-
ing those who most need insulation from state discrimination.
V. FEDERAL AUTHORIZATION OF STATE ACTION WHICH WOULD
OTHERWISE BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
As discussed above, federal power to discriminate against aliens
is derived from the Constitution and is merely subject to a rational
basis standard of review.1" States, on the other hand, only have the
power to discriminate against immigrants as long as their laws are not
preempted by federal laws and they either satisfy strict scrutiny or
the political function exception.78 The distinction between the higher
standard of review applied to the states and the broad discretion
given to the national government raises an important legal question:
if the federal government delegates some of its power over immigra-
tion to the states, thereby allowing states to discriminate on Con-
gress's behalf, which standard of review applies? The three compet-
ing doctrinal bases underlying the review of alienage laws become
critically important because each produces a different result.
A. State Discrimination Against Aliens Based on Federal
Statutory Authorization
Based upon the Supremacy Clause,79 federal law supersedes any
conflicting state laws. In the case of a direct and obvious conflict be-
tween federal and state statutes, the resolution is clear: the state
statute is simply invalid.1" Federal law effectively preempts state
176. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
177. See discussion supra Part III.
178. See discussion supra Part IV.
179. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
180. See id.
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law. 8'
Although state laws may be invalidated by federal preemption,
the federal government has the ability to specifically authorize-or
un-preempt--state laws.'8 By making federal legislation consistent
with state legislation, the federal government can undo the conflict.
This act of un-preempting gives states the ability to act in congruence
with federal legislation. Therefore, states initially foreclosed from
legislation in a certain arena due to preemption can regulate if the
federal government grants authorization.'a
State and federal regulations regarding air pollution illustrate
the dynamics of federal preemption and authorization. The original
Clean Air Act' enacted by Congress in 1955, for example, was pri-
marily aimed at increasing federal research and assistance in air pol-
lution prevention."a It contained no provision for federal automobile
emission standards."+ However, several states established their own
motor vehicle emission standards.'' Subsequently, the Senate
Committee on Public Works decided that a single national standard
was preferable.' It believed that each state having its own regulation
would "result in chaos insofar as manufacturers, dealers, and users
are concerned."'' 9
A number of states, including California, continued to establish
separate emission regulations." ° In response, Congress amended the
Clean Air Act in 1967 to "impose federal preemption over motor
vehicle emission standards."19' Consequently, state regulation of
automobile tailpipe emissions was preempted by the federal Clean
Air Act.
The federal government, however, created an exception for Cali-
fornia" because of its early efforts to control its severe air quality
problems.' Congress essentially un-preempted the California state
181. See id.
182. See Manheim, supra note 45, at 944-45.
183. See id. at 949.
184. 42U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7671q (1988 & Supp. 111991).
185. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl.
Conservation, 17 F.3d 521,524 (2d Cir. 1994).
186. See id.
187. See id. at 525.
188. See id. at 524.
189. S. REP. No. 89-192, at 6 (1965).
190. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 17 F.3d at 525.
191. Id.; Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 208, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
192. See Air Quality Act of 1967, § 208(b).
193. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 17 F.3d at 525.
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emission standards. "Over the adamant objection of the auto indus-
try, which sought a single national standard to avoid undue economic
strain,"'" the Senate Committee was persuaded by the state's argu-
ments that "'their unique problems and pioneering efforts' warranted
a waiver from preemption."'95 California was allowed to create its
own emission standards, subject to the approval of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the agency responsible for enforcing the
federal standards.'96 This un-preemption gave California the power
to enforce its own regulations, which were parallel to, but more strin-
gent than, the federal regulations."9
Federal preemption in the area of automobile emissions stan-
dards demonstrates Congress's ability to authorize states to act if the
underlying doctrinal basis is federal statutory authorization. Simi-
larly, Congress could constitutionally authorize the states to regulate
alienage and discriminate against immigrants if the underlying basis
for congressional authorization is federal statutory authorization.
Federal statutes initially foreclose states from the regulation of inuni-
gration 98 If Congress un-preempts the federal immigration statutes
and allows the states to act in concert with federal law, as Congress
did with California regarding emission standards, the states could
regulate in the area of immigration.
The issue then becomes whether the underlying doctrinal basis
of a state's authority to regulate in alienage cases is that they were
authorized-or un-preempted. The Supreme Court has yet to clarify
the actual basis.' An argument can be made, however, that if alien-
age cases are analyzed based on principles of federal preemption, the
federal government can authorize the states to discriminate against
aliens. This approach, however, would give the states broad discre-
tionary power over immigration that would be detrimental to the
rights of immigrants, and contrary to the plenary powers doctrine.
If judicial scrutiny of state laws discriminating against aliens
were based upon federal statutory authorization, the states would be
allowed to act on the federal government's behalf because they are
merely following supreme authority. The federal government can es-
194. Id. at 525.
195. Id.
196. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl.
Conservation, 79 F.3d 1298, 1302 (2d Cir. 1996).
197. See id.
198. See Immigration in the National Interest Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988).
199. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982) (omitting the explicit basis for the decision).
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tablish laws the states are required to follow; if state law conflicts
with federal law, the federal government, by revising its law, can es-
sentially un-preempt the state law.m In addition, if the analysis of
state discrimination against aliens were based upon principles of fed-
eralism, the same analysis would apply.2' The federal government
has exclusive control over alienage, and if the federal government is
authorized by the Constitution to act, it can plausibly delegate some
of that power to the states.2
On the other hand, if the challenge to state discrimination
against aliens were based upon equal protection principles, the fed-
eral government would be constrained by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: Congress cannot authorize the states to violate the Constitu-
tion.' The preferred method of analyzing alienage cases should be
based upon equal protection principles. Applying this method of
analysis, immigrants affected by recent legislation-Proposition 187,
the Welfare Reform Act, the Immigration in the National Interest
Act-would be given the protection they deserve under the Consti-
tution. The states cannot avoid the constitutional constraints im-
posed on them simply because the federal government has decided to
let them act on their behalf with a lower standard of judicial review.
B. State Discrimination Against Aliens Based on Federalism
The federal government has exclusive, plenary power over the
regulation of immigration. ' Therefore, "any entry by states into this
realm necessarily invades federal power, whether it is affirmatively
exercised or not." 5  State interference with national immigration
matters is generally not tolerated.
200. See Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). See also Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank, 161
U.S. 275, 283 (1896) (holding that a New York statute and a [f]ederal statute di-
rectly conflict). State interference with [f]ederal policies and agencies is
"absolutely void, wherever such attempted exercise of authority expressly con-
flicts with the laws of the United States, and either frustrates the purpose of the
national legislation or impairs the efficiency of these agencies of the [f]ederal
government to discharge the duties, for the performance of which they were cre-
ated." Id.
201. See Manheim, supra note 45, at 958-60; discussion supra Part III.A.
202. See Manheim, supra, note 45, at 949.
203. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (citing Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969)).
204. See discussion supra Part III.
205. Manheim, supra note 45, at 959.
206. See id.; see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)
(holding that California cannot use a federal law that creates racial ineligibility
for citizenship as a basis for barring commercial fishing licenses).
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This concept is an extension of the standard preemption doc-
trine.' A federal/state conflict-whether of statutory provisions or
of objectives-is only one of two ways in which congressional action
may render state action invalid. An additional way is for Congress to
"occupy the field" of the regulated area.2 If Congress decides to oc-
cupy the field, state action in that area is invalid regardless of its con-
gruence with federal actions and policies.' "Where federal power is
not only plenary but also exclusive, it may be said that Congress
'occupies the field' whether or not it exercises that power."'21
The dynamics of federalism and the interplay of federal and
state power are illustrated in the context of the Commerce Clause.
The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate commerce.
211
Specifically, it provides that Congress' shall have the power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes., 212 Based on this express delega-
tion of authority, Congress can regulate persons, products, or activi-
ties connected to interstate transactions. 2" In fact, the Supreme
Court defers significantly to Congress's regulation of private sector
activities falling within its commerce power.214 This grant of power is
interpreted as committing this subject matter to Congress-allowing
Congress to occupy the field-and therefore removing the powers of
states to oversee local matters that are considered a regulation of
commerce.
21
A broad reading of the Commerce Clause "not only grant[s] a
sweeping power to the federal government but it ... also restrict[s]
the ability of individual states to adopt laws which burden the forms
of commerce which [are] committed to the control of the federal
government. 2 1 6 Due to federal plenary power in this area, when a
state regulation conflicts with federal legislation enacted under the
Commerce Clause, the federal statute controls.1 7 On the other hand,
Congress may enact legislation specifically approving state regulation
207. See Manheim, supra note 45, at 959-60.
208. See id. at 959.
209. See id.
210. Id.
211. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
212. Id.
213. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 103, at 132.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 131.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 281.
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affecting commerce."
The Constitution, however, does not explicitly define the
boundaries of commerce power when Congress has not acted in a
certain area.219 If the federal government is authorized to legislate in
an area of commerce and institutes no law, it remains unclear
whether Congress intends that area to be free of regulation or
whether Congress intends states to enact any law they wish.' This
question is commonly referred to as the Dormant Commerce Clause
problem2n
In the alienage context, when Congress has not exercised its
power and it lies dormant, states may not regulate in this area.2 Be-
cause Congress has so completely dominated the regulation of immi-
gration, there is no room for additional state regulation even if Con-
gress's power is dormant.m However, Congress may choose to
delegate some of its exclusive power to the states24 Based on prin-
ciples of federalism, as long as Congress itself has the constitutional
authority to act, it can authorize the states to act.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Congress
may direct the states to regulate in a particular field or a particular
way in New York v. United States.2m In that case, the state of New
York challenged the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act. The Act stated that "[e]ach State shall be responsible
for providing... for the disposal of... low-level radioactive waste
generated within the State ..... 2 The Court held the Act was un-
constitutional because "Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to en-
act and enforce a federal regulatory program. ' '
The Court reasoned the Constitution has never been interpreted






223. See Manheim, supra note 45, at 958-60 (discussing the "dormant immi-
gration clause").
224. See id.
225. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
226. See id. at 154.
227. Id. at 151 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(1)(A) (1985)).
228. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,288 (1981)).
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particular way.2 9 "The allocation of power contained in the Com-
merce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate
commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate the
state governments' regulation of interstate commerce." m Therefore,
Congress does have the power to encourage the states to regulate in
particular areas, but it lacks the power to directly compel the states to
require or prohibit certain acts. ' Limited by principles of the Tenth
Amendment,22 the Court held that Congress can authorize-but not
require-the states to act on its behalf as long as Congress itself has
the power. 3
An analogy can be drawn between the Dormant Commerce
Clause and state regulation of immigration. Congress may affirma-
tively consent to state action which would otherwise be an unconsti-
tutional violation of the Commerce Clause if the underlying doctrinal
basis is federalism. 4 As demonstrated in New York, "[t]he Consti-
tution enables the Federal Government to pre-empt state regulation
contrary to federal interests, and it permits the Federal Govern-
ment . . . to [encourage the states] to adopt suggested regulatory
schemes."' 5 Similarly, Congress could authorize the states to regu-
late immigration as long as the federal government is not
"commandeering" a state legislature.36 Because Congress itself
would have the power to discriminate against aliens, there is no rea-
son why such discrimination cannot be conducted by Congress in
conjunction with the states.
Thus, if the underlying doctrinal basis of alienage cases is fed-
eralism, Congress has the ability to validly authorize the states to dis-
criminate against aliens. The federal government can delegate its
exclusive power to the states. State legislation otherwise subjected to
a higher standard of judicial review would now be dictated by Con-
gress. Therefore, discrimination against aliens would need only sat-
isfy the federal government's standard of review-rational basis.
229. See id. at 166.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. U.S. CONST. amend. X. "If a power is delegated to Congress in the Con-
stitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that
power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the
Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred
on Congress." New York, 505 U.S. at 156.
233. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166-67.
234. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 103, at 281.
235. New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
236. See id. at 175-76.
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This would allow the states to avoid a higher standard of review-
strict scrutiny for alienage-because they are being directed by Con-
gress. The federal government, in a sense, would be delegating its
lower standard of review to the states. In order to implement their
legislation, state legislators would argue that the underlying doctrinal
basis of alienage cases is federalism. Like the preemption approach,
however, this approach is detrimental to the status of immigrants be-
cause it grants broad discretionary power to the states thereby ena-
bling them to deprive aliens of rights and benefits.
C. State Discrimination Against Aliens Based on Equal Protection
State discrimination against aliens is likely to be upheld by
courts if the basis behind the analysis of laws regulating alienage is
federal statutory authorization or federalism. Because of the federal
government's exclusive control of immigration, Congress can
authorize the states to act on its behalf, limited only by Tenth
Amendment principles. However, if judicial scrutiny of state laws
discriminating against aliens were based upon equal protection prin-
ciples, the states will have a more difficult time implementing legisla-
tion directed against immigrants even if authorized by Congress.
At least outside the alienage context, equal protection principles
apply identically to the states and to the federal government.ns The
federal government, however, cannot authorize the states to violate
the Constitution. The Supreme Court has held that Congress may
not sanction what would otherwise be a violation of equal protec-
tion."
1. Cases supporting an equal protection approach
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward,"° the Court held
that Congress may not sanction state violations of Equal Protection.24
The Court found that the state of Alabama violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause by taxing out-of-state insurance companies at a higher
rate than domestic insurance companies.24 The Commerce Clause
237. See id. at 156-57.
238. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995); City
of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
239. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,731 (1982).
240. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
241. See id. at 880.
242. See id. at 869.
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was not violated because Congress authorized the action.'
The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause,
is integrally concerned with whether a state purpose impli-
cates local or national interests. The Equal Protection
Clause, in contrast, is concerned with whether a state pur-
pose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the discrimi-
nation involves local or other interests is not central to the
inquiry to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local
industry is a legitimate state interest in the Commerce
Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal
protection analysis.'
Therefore, the Court was left to invalidate the law on equal pro-
tection grounds.24 The State argued that because Congress, through
the McCarran-Ferguson Act,m authorized the states to impose taxes
burdening interstate commerce, the tax at issue was valid.4 7 The
Court found, however, that "the State's view ignore[d] the differ-
ences between the Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis
and the consequent different purposes those two constitutional pro-
visions serve."2m Based on a Commerce Clause analysis, the Court
balanced a state's legitimate interest against the burden the state law
would impose on interstate commerce.2 49 Under equal protection, if
the state's purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands, as
long as the burden is rationally related to that purpose m "The two
constitutional provisions perform different functions in the analysis
of the permissible scope of a State's power-one protects interstate
commerce, and the other protects persons from unconstitutional dis-
crimination by the States."' The Court found that "[e]qual protec-
tion restraints [were] applicable even though the effect of the dis-
crimination in [the] case [was] similar to the type of burden with
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned.
' 2
Thus, the Court distinguished Congress's authorization of the
states to impose taxes that burden interstate commerce on grounds of
243. See id. at 880.
244. Id. at 876-77 n.6.
245. See id. at 869.
246. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1997).
247. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 470 U.S. at 880.
248. Id. at 881.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. Id. (citing Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U.S. 421,423-24 (1921)).
252. Id.
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equal protection.2" Although economic regulation can satisfy the
Equal Protection Clause by bearing a rational relation to a legitimate
state purpose,2- the Court found that the promotion of domestic in-
surance business was not a legitimate state purpose.us Under equal
protection, the promotion of domestic industry is not a legitimate
state purpose when furthered by discrimination.2 6
If the reasoning of Metropolitan Life is applied in the alienage
context, Congress can be prevented from authorizing the states to
violate the Constitution in the same way. Congress cannot direct
states to discriminate against immigrants if the discrimination would
violate the Equal Protection Clause. The holding in Metropolitan
Life implies that valid exercises by the federal government authoriz-
ing the states to act under the Commerce Clause or other constitu-
tional provisions may well be deemed invalid if analyzed under equal
protection principles.
Roe v. Anderson,2 a recent California case, demonstrates the in-
ability of Congress to authorize the states to enact laws which violate
equal protection.8 In, Roe new residents of California brought an
action challenging the constitutionality of a durational residency re-
quirement which limited welfare benefits through the recipient's first
year of residency.5 The district court "held that the requirement pe-
nalized migration and violated equal protection."
In August of 1996 Congress enacted a new federal welfare law,
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA). 6 PRWORA replaced the previous Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)12 program with a new
program entitled Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF).2 6 Through PRWORA, Congress substantially increased the
253. See id. at 880.
254. See id.
255. See id. at 882.
256. See id.
257. 966 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Cal. 1997).
258. See id. at 984; see also Maldonado v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare,
No. 97-4155, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15474 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1997) (applying same
analysis and holding similar Pennsylvania law unconstitutional on basis of equal
protection).
259. See Roe, 966 F. Supp. at 979-80.
260. Id. at 983.
261. 42 U.S.C. § 604 (Supp. 1997).
262. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03 (West 1991).
263. See Roe, 966 F. Supp. at 979.
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states' discretion to create federally supported welfare plans.2" Con-
gress "specifically authorized the states to apply a one-year dura-
tional residency requirement" for full welfare benefits.2 6
The PRWORA provides: A State operating a program
funded under this part may apply to a family the rules
(including benefit amounts) of the program funded under
this part of another State if the family has moved to the
State from the other State and has resided in the State for
less than 12 months.2 "
In October of 1996, California submitted its TANF plan to the
United States Department of Health and Human Services: its plan
included a durational residency requirement consistent with Califor-
nia law and PRWORA.m
PRWORA effectively limited the level of benefits of welfare re-
cipients to those provided in their state of prior residence.m The
plaintiffs argued "that the disparity between the California level and
the level of the other forty-nine states will vary a good deal depend-
ing on the state of prior residence."2' In addition, "[t]he cost of living
in the various states may also affect a comparison of the relative
benefit levels."' 0 Plaintiffs asserted that "the residency requirement...
[placed] many recently arrived welfare families on an inferior footing
relative to welfare families in the state from which the newcomers
moved.", '
In support of the congressional authorization, defendants argued
that the "overriding purpose of [the state legislation] is to limit Cali-
fornia's welfare expenditures."'  The defendants contended that
California spends a significant amount of money each year on welfare
benefits and has the right to control the program.tm Furthermore, the
defendants claimed that the legislation does not violate equal protec-
tion because "new residents receive the same level of cash benefits as
they would have received in the state of their prior residency."' 4
264. See id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 979 n.5.
267. See id. at 979.
268. See id. at 980.
269. Id. at 981.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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The court based its analysis on the right to travel and equal pro-
tection cases in which the Supreme Court "set aside as unconstitu-
tional distinctions drawn among residents of a state-all of whom are
bona fide residents-based on the incipiency or duration of their
residency." 5 The court stated that the "right of migration 'protects
residents of a State from being disadvantaged, or from being treated
differently, simply because of the timing of their migration, from
other similarly situated residents.', 6 Acknowledging that the states
have broad discretion to create welfare benefit programs through
congressional authorization, "'Congress may not authorize the States
to violate the Equal Protection Clause."'t n Thus, the court held that
the state legislation based on congressional authorization was an un-
constitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
If the rationale of Roe is applied in the alienage context, Con-
gress can be prevented from authorizing the states to violate the Con-
stitution in the same way. Congress cannot direct the states to dis-
criminate against immigrants if the discrimination would violate the
Equal Protection Clause. The holding in Roe implies that seemingly
valid exercises by the federal government authorizing the states to act
may be deemed invalid if analyzed under equal protection principles.
2. Recent legislation against aliens
Legislation enacted by the states under the Immigration in the
National Interest Acte 9 and the Welfare Reform Act' denying
benefits to aliens can be effectively challenged based upon equal pro-
tection principles. These federal laws authorize the states to institute
legislation discriminating against both legal and illegal aliens."1 The
denial of benefits is subject to different standards of judicial review
depending on the status of the alien being discriminated againstw If
the state is enacting legislation against a legal alien, the law is subject
to strict scrutiny.2 If, however, the law discriminates against an ille-
275. Id.
276. Id. (quoting New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904 (1986)).
277. Id. at 984-85 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969)).
278. See id. at 984-95.
279. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1995).
280. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
281. See id.
282. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 103, at 742.
283. See id.
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gal alien, it is subject to rational basis."' A higher standard of
"rational basis plus" is applied if the illegal alien is a child being de-
prived of a quasi-fundamental right."'
a. legal aliens
Because of the strict scrutiny standard that must be satisfied as
part of an equal protection analysis, it is unlikely that states will be
able to pass laws that deny benefits to legal aliens.' To classify per-
sons on the basis of United States citizenship, "the state must demon-
strate a compelling purpose for treating aliens in a less favorable
manner than citizens."' In addition, the state must use the least re-
strictive means of achieving its compelling interest.'
States will likely try to justify denying benefits to legal aliens on
the theory that they have a compelling interest in saving money and
in preserving state resources for United States citizens." As in Roe
v. Anderson, the states will argue that the overriding purpose of the
legislation is to limit state welfare expenditures. For instance, Cali-
fornia spends a significant amount of money each year supporting le-
gal aliens through state benefits and welfare programs.' 9 "The num-
ber of immigrants receiving state welfare assistance has risen
significantly in recent years." 29' States will argue that citizens do not
want to spend money supporting those who are not United States
citizens.292 "By allowing immigrants to compete with citizens for wel-
fare, [the states] allow non-citizens to take advantage disproportion-
ately of scarce welfare resources while ignoring [their] own citizens,
minorities, and urban poor."293 Aliens should not be allowed into the
country if they are merely going to deplete state resources.
284. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 (1982).
285. See id. at 230.
286. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 103, at 742.
287. Id.
288. See id.
289. See David Broder, Clinton Works Both Sides of Welfare and Immigration
Issues, DENVER POST, Apr. 10, 1997, at B-07 ("[T]he cutoff of benefits to legal
immigrants was fueled by a desire for budgetary savings (an estimated $22 billion
in six years) .... ).
290. See Lamar Smith, Immigration and Welfare Reform, USA TODAY, Mar.
1997, at 30 ("21% of immigrant households currently receive welfare, compared
to 14% of native households.").
291. Id.
292. See id. ("Americans are willing to help those who need it, but have grown
increasingly tired of subsidizing non-citizens .....
293. Id.
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Advocates for the rights of legal aliens will likely argue that the
state's interest is not compelling and furthermore that the means of
achieving the purpose is not the least restrictive. First, in most cases,
the noncitizen who is a lawful resident is subject to the same federal
and state taxation as the resident citizen.'4 Legal aliens contribute to
the work force and pay their taxes, as do citizens.295 The United
States legally admits the aliens and now states propose to deprive
them of the basic tools for survival through this legislation-services
providing food, shelter, emergency medical care, prenatal care, and
more. In denying these benefits states hope to save money; however,
the long term effects might ultimately prove to be more costly.
26
Therefore, the purpose behind the legislation is not compelling.
Second, denying state benefits in order to save economic re-
sources is not the least restrictive means of achieving this state pur-
pose. If the states cannot handle the influx of legal immigrants, the
federal government should limit the number of legal immigrants
admitted to this country. Depriving immigrants of essential state
benefits does not deter them from entering the country if they are
being legally admitted by the federal government. Recent federal
legislation attempts to deter legal aliens from sponsoring family
members to legally join them in the United States. 2  The legislation
achieves this goal by making the families financially responsible for
them. There are other means by which to prevent legal immigrants
from burdening state resources." Therefore, the states will have a
294. See id.
295. See Broder, supra note 289, at B-07.
As for the welfare bill provisions ending benefits for legal aliens, Vice
President Al Gore told the California legislature last month that it was
'harsh and unfair to tell 4 million people in California who work here,
pay taxes here, maybe even serve in the military here that you are not
going to receive the helping hand that everyone else who is legally living
here is entitled to.'
Id.
296. See Sabin Russell, Bill Blocks Medi-Cal for Noncitizens, S.F. CHRON.,
June 24, 1996, at Al (stating that county emergency rooms will be swamped with
immigrants seeking care that they cannot receive at clinics and an eruption of
communicable diseases and vaccine-preventable diseases will occur).
297. See Fred Alvarez, Bill Threatens Immigrant Health Care, L.A. TIMES,
June 25, 1996, at B1. The proposed legislation requires legal immigrants to in-
clude the income of their sponsors along with their own when signing up for
Medi-Cal health care coverage. The legislation is intended to ensure that the
costs are not borne by any government agency. See id.
298. See Jonathon C. Dunlap, The Absent Federal Partner, SPECrRUM: J.
STATE GoVERNMENT, Jan. 1994, at 6. The federal government could decrease
the number of immigrants it allows to enter the country legally, and increase its
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difficult time satisfying the strict scrutiny standard. If analyzed upon
this basis, Congress cannot authorize the states to discriminate
against legal aliens through such legislation because it violates prin-
ciples of equal protection.
b. illegal aliens
Recent state legislation denying illegal immigrants access to edu-
cation and various benefits can also be effectively challenged based
upon equal protection principles.2 9 In order to enact laws discrimi-
nating against illegal immigrants, states must satisfy the rational basis
standard of review-a legitimate state interest must be rationally re-
lated to the means chosen to achieve the interest.3 The Supreme
Court held in Plyler v. Doe, however, that states cannot deprive un-
documented immigrant children access to education?" The Court
used a heightened standard of review, "rational basis plus," to invali-
date legislation denying the right to education: an important state in-
terest must be substantially related to the means of achieving the in-
terest.0
Discrimination by states against illegal aliens may violate equal
protection depending on the type of benefit being denied. Legisla-
tion denying illegal immigrant children access to public education is
unconstitutional based on the holding in Plyler v. Doe.30 United
States Representative Elton Gallegly has attempted to overturn the
holding in Plyler by enacting state legislation which deprives illegal
immigrant children of the right to education.
States will argue that laws depriving illegal immigrants of gov-
ernmental benefits meet the rational basis standard of review and are
therefore valid. First, the state's legitimate interest is in retaining
government benefits for its citizens. Money should not be spent in
support of those who are living in our country illegally. Second,
financial support for state and local governments who bear a disproportionate
share of the responsibility. See id. "Governor Pete Wilson has called for the
federal government to reimburse California $1.4 billion for the mandated social,
health and correctional services the state has provided to undocumented and
documented immigrants." Id.
299. See 142 CONG. REc. H-2475 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Gallegly).
300. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
301. See id. at 230.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See 142 CONG. REC. H2475 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Gallegly).
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states will contend that withholding these benefits is a means that is
rationally related to achieving this purpose. By denying illegal aliens
governmental benefits, state resources could be saved and used to
support legal citizens. California spends millions of dollars a year
supporting illegal immigrants through welfare and governmental
services.' ° States will argue that depriving illegal aliens of govern-
mental benefits will save the states significant amounts of money per
year.
Advocates for the rights of illegal immigrants will argue, how-
ever, that state legislation denying benefits does not satisfy the ra-
tional basis test even though the state's legitimate interest in preserv-
ing resources is a solid argument. It is a valid purpose for a state to
want to maintain its money to support its own citizens and to deny
help to those who are here illegally. Therefore, states will most likely
satisfy the first prong of the rational basis test-a legitimate interest.
However, the means of achieving this purpose-the denial of
governmental benefits to illegal aliens-is not rationally related to
the state interest in saving money and resources. First, the amount of
money that the illegal alien work force saves the state is probably
more than the overall cost to the state in providing them benefits3 m
Significant numbers of illegals are employed throughout the state for
low wages. They work as day laborers, farm workers, restaurant
employees, domestic workers, and provide essential services for
much lower wages than employing legal citizens." If the illegal im-
migrant work force disappears, the cost to the state of California
305. See Dunlap, supra note 298, at 6. In Los Angeles, it was estimated that
the net state and local costs of providing education, and public health and welfare
was around $400 million. See id.
306. See Meg Rottmand & Valerie Seckler, Employing Illegal Aliens Is a Way
of Life in California, FOOTWEAR NEWS, May 7, 1984, at 1. The following pro-
portions of illegals use public services: free medical 5%; unemployment insur-
ance 4%; food stamps 1%; welfare payments 1% and child schooling 4%. See id.
"Practically no illegals receive the costliest service of all-Social Security-but
77% of illegal workers pay Social Security taxes, and 73% had [f]ederal income
withheld." Id.
307. See id. "If we didn't have illegal aliens, car washes, hotels, restaurants,
and most manufacturers would shut down." Id.
In one case, 2,154 illegal aliens were removed from jobs, and the Cali-
fornia State Human Resources Agency tried without success to fll the
jobs with U.S. citizens. Among the reasons given for the failure were
low wage rates, job categories that were not appealing to local residents,
job difficulty and the long hours demanded by the employers.
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would be significant.3 Illegal immigrants contribute greatly to the
economy by providing inexpensive labor, and in most situations they
pay state taxes and contribute to Social Security.'
Second, depriving illegal immigrants of essential governmental
services will actually increase state costs in the long run.310 If Cali-
fornia denies undocumented aliens preventative health care, emer-
gency medical services, and education, the state will be left with a
population of sick, uneducated people who are unable to work and
contribute to the economy. The burden on the state will be much
greater than simply providing less expensive preventative services.
For example, the cost of prenatal care to pregnant illegal women is
most likely less expensive than the eventual cost to the state in caring
for a sick child. The cost of providing emergency medical care is po-
tentially less expensive than the cost to the state if the medical con-
ditions worsen. In addition, if illegal aliens are denied health serv-
ices, the cost to the state if disease spreads to the entire population
will be enormous. In weighing the benefits that the illegal population
provides in inexpensive labor with the costs of providing them with
essential tools for survival, the deprivation of governmental services
seems unfair, if not immoral.
Finally, illegal aliens are encouraged to remain in this country as
a source of cheap labor. If the government did not want them here,
they could simply deport them. The INS does not actively deport il-
legal aliens, although they know the areas where illegal aliens are
highly populous." In addition, the government does not heavily
prosecute owners of businesses for violating laws against the em-
308. See Dunlap, supra note 298, at 6 ("L.A. Mayor Richard Riordan has
pointed out that if all the undocumented immigrants in Los Angeles were de-
ported, the city's economy would face a recession.").
309. See Rottman & Seckler, supra note 306, at 1. "'[Illegals] have social se-
curity and taxes taken out of their pay... [and] [t]hey will never be able to col-
lect any of the benefits of these programs." Id. "[T]hey also perform tasks that
no one else is willing to do, and they don't drain the unemployment or welfare
systems." Id.
310. See Dunlap, supra note 298, at 6. The denial of government services cre-
ates the potential for numerous social problems. If undocumented immigrants
are not immunized from contagious diseases, whole communities can be affected.
In addition, if they do not receive basic education, they are more vulnerable to
the temptation of crime as a means of supporting themselves and their families.
See id.
311. See Rottman & Seckler, supra note 306, at 1 (stating that the INS was
more likely to participate in raids when business is up but leaves manufacturers
alone when business is slow).
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ployment of illegal aliens.3
Courts should apply an equal protection approach to alienage
discrimination instead of a federal statutory authorization or federal-
ism analysis." Alien residents lack access to the political process and
are vulnerable to governmental denial of their concerns.31" In addi-
tion, the presence of illegal aliens is tolerated as a source of inexpen-
sive labor, but they are virtually defenseless against any abuse or ex-
ploitation imposed on them by the states' citizens and businesses."5
Principles of federal statutory authorization and federalism are not
directly responsive to this problem. Reliance on these doctrines al-
lows Congress to decide how broadly aliens should be made vulner-
able to discrimination and mistreatment by the states. This effec-
tively extends the great judicial deference afforded the federal
government in implementing immigration policy to the state and lo-
cal governments, which may be reacting to feelings of nativism. An
equal protection approach, however, ensures that the states do not
assume undeserved broad discretion in discriminating against immi-
grants.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the distinction between the higher standard of judi-
cial review applied to the states and the deferential standard afforded
the federal government, an important legal question arises if Con-
gress authorizes the states to discriminate against aliens. The three
competing doctrinal bases behind alienage cases become critically
important in determining Congress's ability to delegate authority.
Federal statutory authorization and federalism allow the federal gov-
ernment to empower the states to act on its behalf with little chal-
lenge.
A problem arises, however, if Congress attempts to authorize the
states to violate the Equal Protection Clause. If alienage cases are
based upon principles of equal protection, Congress should be con-
strained in the same ways the states are based on the Fourteenth
312. See MICHAEL Fix & PAUL T. HILL, ENFORCING EMPLOYER SANCrIONS
106-11 (1990). The INS does not focus on the enforcement of employer sanc-
tions. See id. at 73. Criminal sanctions are rarely brought and there are a small
number of civil penalties. See id. at 106-11. When civil penalties are brought,
"the Agency reduces the amount of the initial fine by an average of 59 per cent."
Id. at 110.
313. See Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws, supra note 1, at 1439.
314. See id. at 1427-28.
315. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,219 n.18 (1982).
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Amendment. Congress cannot empower the states to regulate immi-
gration if the actions taken by the states would violate equal protec-
tion.
Equal protection is the preferred method of analysis because it is
responsive to invidious classifications. Based upon the dynamics of
nativism, states often take out their economic and social anxieties on
immigrants through hostile legislation. An equal protection analysis
would best protect immigrants from broad discretionary action by the
states. The burden should be on the federal government to prevent
aliens from unlawfully entering the United States initially, rather
than to starve and kill them through deprivation of governmental
benefits while expecting them to work as a shadow labor force.
The importance of humanity should be reflected within the
sphere of governmental power. Government at all levels should
strive to maintain a minimum level of benevolence towards immi-
grants. Our nation was founded on immigration-we were all once
aliens to this land.
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